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STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF  
AMICUS CURIAE 
 
The statement of identity and interest of amicus is set forth in the 
Motion for Leave to File that was filed on February 28, 2018.  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Mr. Williams is serving a life without parole sentence based, in 
part, on a burglary conviction committed when he was sixteen.1 Without 
this counting as the first of three strikes, he would have faced a standard 
range sentence of 53 – 70 months. See Br. of Pet’r, Appendix “A” 
(Judgment and Sentence, Cowlitz County Superior Court, Cause No. 08-1-
00735-6). Instead, the sentencing court had no choice but to count the 
juvenile conviction as a strike under Washington’s Persistent Offender 
Accountability Act (POAA), RCW 9.94A.555, .570, a sentencing scheme 
that became law in 1994,2 long before the sea change of Roper,3 Graham,4 
Miller,5 and Montgomery,6 as well as this Court’s extension of Miller and 
Graham in State v. Bassett, 198 Wn. App. 714, 349 P.3d 430 (2017), 
review granted, 402 P.3d 827 (2017) (argued Feb. 22, 2018). Graham and 
Miller—as well as this Court’s article I, section 14 jurisprudence 
                                                 
1 Mr. Williams waived his declination hearing. Br. of Pet’r at 1. 
2 The law was created by Initiative No. 539. See RCW 9.94A.555. 
3 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005). 
4 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010). 
5 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012). 
6 Montgomery v. Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016). 
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recognizing that the intrinsic nature of youth undercuts the penological 
justifications for imposing the harshest sentences—require this Court to 
engage with the constitutional dilemma that arises when the POAA 
requires a sentencing court to impose life without the possibility of parole 
on a defendant who committed one or more strike offenses as a juvenile.  
Recognizing the constitutional dimensions of Mr. Williams’ case, 
this Court requested on December 1, 2017, that counsel address at oral 
argument whether “using a conviction that was committed when an 
individual was under the age of 18 years old as a strike in a persistent 
offender case violate[s] the prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment?” Amicus demonstrates that the developments in juvenile 
justice jurisprudence on both the federal and state level must be 
recognized and integrated into review of a life sentence under the POAA 
where a defendant committed one or more strike offenses as a juvenile. 
The POAA as applied to Mr. Williams results in a mandatory sentencing 
scheme under which the sentencing court cannot consider the defendant’s 
youth and its attendant characteristics, in violation of the federal and state 
constitutions. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
First, amicus explains that courts reviewing the constitutionality of 
a life without parole sentence imposed under a recidivist statutory scheme 
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routinely consider all strikes as part of the current offense. With respect to 
the constitutional question posed, amicus explains how Mr. Williams’ life 
without parole sentence runs afoul of the principles on which Graham and 
Miller were decided. Graham not only barred the imposition of life 
without parole on juvenile nonhomicide offenders, but also stands for the 
larger principle that courts must closely scrutinize harsh punishments 
imposed on juveniles, due to their diminished moral culpability. And 
Miller prohibits mandatory life with parole sentencing schemes for 
juvenile homicide offenders, as those schemes deprive courts of the 
opportunity to consider the mitigating qualities of youth. Together, 
Graham and Miller lead to the conclusion that a three strikes law that 
imposes life without parole based, in part, on conduct committed as a 
juvenile, is unconstitutional.  
Second, amicus explains how Mr. Williams’ life without parole 
sentence is unconstitutional under article I, section 14. This Court adopted 
a categorical bar on juvenile life without parole in Bassett because 
traditional proportionality analysis under State v. Fain, 94 Wn.2d 387, 617 
P.2d 720 (1980), does not “adequately address the special concerns 
inherent to juvenile sentencing.” Bassett, 198 Wn. App. ¶ 49. While Mr. 
Williams was not a juvenile at the time of the third strike, his age at the 
time of the first strike is material to the larger constitutional inquiry, as 
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those same “special concerns” are at play. The only way to avoid the risk 
that harsh punishment might be imposed on those whose strike offenses 
reflect transient immaturity is to adopt a corollary of the categorical bar on 
juvenile life without parole: that no offense committed as a juvenile can 
count as a strike. 
ARGUMENT 
 
I. WASHINGTON COURTS HAVE LONG CONSIDERED 
ALL STRIKES IN REVIEWING A LIFE SENTENCE 
UNDER PERSISTENT OFFENDER SENTENCING 
SCHEMES.  
 
In Washington, long-standing precedent demonstrates that a court 
reviewing the constitutionality of a life without parole sentence imposed 
under a persistent offender statute considers all strikes that underlie the 
sentence.7 In the watershed case of Fain, in which our supreme court 
considered the proportionality of a life sentence under the habitual 
offender statute in effect in 1980, the court looked at the nature of “each of 
the crimes that underlies his conviction as a habitual offender” in 
determining whether Mr. Fain’s sentence was proportional. 94 Wn.2d at 
397-98 (emphasis added) (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 295, 
                                                 
7 This Court requested supplemental briefing on November 15, 2017, on the issue of 
whether Mr. Williams may collaterally attack his 1997 conviction. While the parties 
have ably responded to the Court’s inquiry, amicus provides a brief discussion of 
how consideration of all strike offenses is necessary at the time a court sentences a 
defendant under a persistent offender statutory scheme.  
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100 S. Ct. 1133, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)) 
(considering that each of the crimes underlying his life without parole 
sentence were victimless and involved fraud to obtain small sums of 
money). Rather than amounting to a collateral attack on the earlier strike 
convictions, the consideration of the conduct underlying the prior strike 
convictions is—and has been—central to proportionality review under 
article I, section 14. Failure to scrutinize Mr. Williams’ prior strikes would 
be an abdication of this Court’s duty to ensure that a life without parole 
sentence does not violate either the Eighth Amendment or article I, section 
14, and that analysis necessarily encompasses a consideration of all 
criminal conduct that forms the basis for a life without parole sentence 
under the POAA. 
II. THE PERSISTENT OFFENDER ACCOUNTABILITY ACT 
LEAVES SENTENCING COURTS WITH NO DISCRETION 
TO CONSIDER THE MITIGATING QUALITIES OF 
YOUTH, IN VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT. 
 
While Roper, Graham, and Miller reflect a sea change in the 
sentencing of juvenile offenders, the principles on which the Supreme 
Court rested its holdings apply with equal force when an adult sentencing 
scheme imposes harsh punishment based, in part, on past juvenile criminal 
conduct. Amicus discusses these principles to demonstrate that a life 
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without parole sentence under the POAA cannot rest upon a conviction for 
a crime committed as juvenile.8    
A. The Principles that Drove the Decision in Graham Apply in 
Other Sentencing Contexts Where Punishment Is Imposed 
Because of Juvenile Criminal Conduct. 
 
In Graham, the Court held life without parole for juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders was categorically barred.9 560 U.S. at 82. It 
explained that “[a]n offender’s age is relevant to the Eighth Amendment, 
and criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness into 
account at all would be flawed.” Id. at 76. In determining that life without 
                                                 
8 Consideration of this constitutional argument does not raise the problem of a mixed 
petition. Cf. In re Hankerson, 149 Wn.2d 695, 697, 72 P.3d 703 (2003) (if a PRP 
filed after the one year period expires contains multiple claims, and one or more of 
the claims is time barred, the entire petition must be dismissed as a mixed petition). 
Here, neither argument is time-barred. Mr. Williams’ jurisdictional argument is not 
subject to the one year bar, as he alleged that the Thurston County Superior Court 
sentence imposed for first degree burglary in 1997 was “in excess of the court’s 
jurisdiction,” RCW 10.73.100(5), as that court’s failure to conduct a declination 
hearing and make findings on the record deprived that court of jurisdiction to 
sentence him. Br. of Pet’r at 5-7. Mr. Williams has alternatively argued that the 
failure to conduct a declination hearing and make findings on the record renders the 
one year time bar inapplicable, because 1997 judgment and sentence for the burglary 
conviction is not “valid on its face and…[was not] rendered by a court of competent 
jurisdiction.” RCW 10.73.090. Br. of Pet’r at 20. Nor is the argument that RCW 
9.94A.570 is unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Williams subject to the one year bar 
of RCW 10.73.090. RCW 10.73.100(2) (one year bar does not apply if defendant’s 
petition is based on argument that the statute “defendant was convicted of violating 
was unconstitutional on its face or as applied to the defendant's conduct.”). 
9 The categorical proportionality analysis begins with objective indicia of national 
consensus with regard to the sentencing practice in question, Graham, 560 U.S. at 
62, and then requires judicial exercise of independent judgment to consider the 
culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along 
with the severity of the punishment in question,” id. at 67. Categorical 
proportionality also examines the penological justifications for the sentencing 
practice, including incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation. Id. at 71. 
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parole was categorically barred for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, the 
Graham court relied on juveniles’ lessened culpability and noted that a 
juvenile’s transgression “is not as morally reprehensible as that of an 
adult.” Id. at 68 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835, 108 
S. Ct. 2687, 101 L. Ed. 2d 702 (1988) (plurality opinion)). The Graham 
Court affirmed that “[i]t remains true that “[f]rom a moral standpoint it 
would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an 
adult.” Id. at 68 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).  
The Supreme Court’s decision to ban juvenile life without parole 
for juvenile nonhomicide crimes is based on “these fundamental 
differences [that] cannot logically be limited to the analysis of some legal 
issues but not others because these are fixed characteristics of 
adolescence.” Beth Caldwell, Twenty-Five to Life for Adolescent 
Mistakes: Juvenile Strikes As Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 46 U.S.F. 
L. Rev. 581, 604 (2012). Indeed, the Supreme Court has relied on its 
conclusions regarding the fixed characteristics of adolescence, recognizing 
the relevance of age in conducting the Miranda10 custody analysis. J.D.B. 
v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 264–65, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 180 L. Ed. 2d 
310 (2011). The Court’s decision in J.D.B. “reflects a commitment to its 
                                                 
10 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 
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conclusions regarding the nature of adolescence and a willingness to apply 
research regarding characteristics of adolescents to constitutional legal 
issues impacting this population.” Caldwell, supra at 605.  
Like the sentencing procedures in Graham, the POAA is a 
sentencing procedure that fails to take youth into account, in contravention 
of Graham. And as the J.D.B. Court noted, there is no need to revisit the 
underpinnings of the “commonsense conclusions” about the nature of 
juveniles. 564 U.S. at 272 (finding no reason to “reconsider” the 
observations about the common “nature of juveniles” (quoting Graham, 
560 U.S. at 68)). Instead, it is the duty of courts to consider the application 
of these commonsense conclusions in new contexts, and amicus urges the 
Court to do exactly that in Mr. Williams’ case. The central principle in 
Graham—that juveniles are intrinsically less culpable than adults—casts 
significant doubt on the constitutionality of using a strike committed as a 
juvenile to support a life without parole sentence. See Caldwell, supra, at 
605 (noting that it would be “inconsistent to ignore [Graham’s] 
conclusions in the legal analysis of the constitutionality of using juvenile 
strikes”). 
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B. The POAA Is a Mandatory Sentencing Scheme that Removes 
Youth from the Balance, in Violation of Miller’s Central 
Principle that Youth Mitigates Culpability.  
 
Miller teaches that courts must give exacting scrutiny to mandatory 
penalty schemes that impose punishment without appropriate 
consideration of youthfulness. See generally 567 U.S. 460. The Miller 
Court extended its holdings in Roper and Graham to hold that “penalty 
schemes” that include mandatory life-without-parole sentences for 
juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment because they impose harsh 
sentences without appropriate consideration of the youthfulness of the 
defendant. Id. at 474. “By removing youth from the balance,” the 
mandatory schemes the Court invalidated “prevent[ed] the sentencer from 
taking into account [the] central considerations” identified in Graham. Id. 
Because of juveniles’ lessened moral culpability and enhanced prospect of 
reformation, the penological justifications for imposing the harshest 
sentences on juveniles are diminished. See id. at 472. 
The POAA is a mandatory penalty scheme that imposes 
punishment without appropriate consideration of youthfulness of one or 
more of the strikes, in contravention of Miller’s central principle. While it 
is indisputable that Mr. Williams was sentenced to life without parole 
when he was an adult, the reach of Miller cannot be so easily limited. The 
sentence imposed on Mr. Williams is as much a punishment for the first 
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strike committed at the age of sixteen as it is for the other two strikes 
committed as an adult. But under the POAA, the trial court had no 
discretion to consider the characteristics of youth that undercut the 
justification for imposing the harshest sentence short of capital 
punishment. Miller therefore counsels that Mr. Williams should not serve 
a life sentence based, in part, on criminal conduct committed as a juvenile. 
Some federal courts have applied the principles in Roper, Graham, 
and Miller to recidivist statutes, recognizing the diminished culpability of 
juvenile offenders in this context. In United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 
519, 529, 531-32 (4th Cir. 2014), the court determined that the life 
sentence imposed under the de facto career offender provision of the 
federal sentencing guidelines was substantively unreasonable, because 
some of the predicate convictions were committed when Howard was 
between sixteen and eighteen. The trial court had based its upward 
departure on Howard’s conviction, at the age of sixteen, for selling 
cocaine to an undercover officer, and on his conviction, at the age of 
eighteen to voluntary manslaughter.11 Id. at 529. Invoking Miller, 
Graham, and Roper, the court vacated Howard’s sentence as substantively 
                                                 
11 Other juvenile criminal convictions the trial court noted were providing fictitious 
information to a police officer, when Howard was seventeen, and second degree 
trespass and possession of cocaine, although these did not appear to be the basis on 
which the trial court justified its upward departure. Id. at 531. 
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unreasonable, relying on the Supreme Court’s recognition of “the 
diminished culpability of juvenile offenders, given their lack of maturity, 
vulnerability to social pressures, and malleable identities.” Id. at 532 
(citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 471; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Roper, 543 U.S. 
at 569-70). The court criticized the district court’s sentence for its failure 
to appreciate “what we cannot ignore…that youth is a ‘mitigating factor 
derive[d] from the fact that the signature qualities of youth are transient; as 
individuals mature, the impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate 
in younger years can subside.’” Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).12  
                                                 
12 Other federal courts, deciding cases before Miller, have reached different results. 
United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 457 (6th Cir. 2010) (determining a prior 
felony drug conviction committed when defendant was seventeen counted as 
qualifying felony under the three-strikes provision of the Controlled Substances Act, 
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)); United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(same). Both the Graham court and the Scott court unpersuasively distinguished 
Graham v. Florida based on the fact that the defendants were adults at the time of the 
commission of the third strike offense. Graham, 622 F.3d at 462 (noting that Graham 
was an adult when he received the mandatory life term); Scott, 610 F.3d at 1018 
(same). The juvenile defendants in both Roper and Graham were charged, tried, and 
convicted as adults. Graham, 560 U.S. at 53 (“Graham’s prosecutor elected to charge 
Graham as an adult.”); Roper, 543 U.S. at 557 (“[Simmons] was tried as an adult.”). 
The dissent in United States v. Graham, however, foreshadowed the Fourth 
Circuit’s result in Howard, arguing that the majority’s decision “violates sound 
principles of penological policy based on the Eighth Amendment values recently 
outlined by the Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida,” 622 F.3d at 465 (Merrit, J., 
dissenting), and that Graham “should at least make our court and the court system 
more sensitive to the important distinction between juvenile and adult criminal 
conduct,” id. at 469. 
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Further, our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Houston-
Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017), signals that Washington 
courts will interpret the Eighth Amendment to ensure that the principles 
that drove the specific holdings in Roper, Graham, and Miller continue to 
have vitality in sentencing contexts not originally addressed by those 
specific cases.13 The court in Houston-Sconiers expanded Miller by 
declaring that a court’s ability to fully address the mitigating qualities of 
youth requires absolute discretion to depart from sentencing guidelines 
(including the mandatory sentencing enhancements specifically at issue in 
the case) when sentencing juveniles to lengthy sentences under adult 
sentencing schemes. 188 Wn.2d at 21.  
III. ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 IS MORE PROTECTIVE THAN  
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT IN THE JUVENILE 
SENTENCING CONTEXT, AND SO SHOULD NOT 
PERMIT OFFENSES COMMITTED AS A JUVENILE TO 
COUNT AS A STRIKE. 
 
While Eighth Amendment jurisprudence brings into relief the 
constitutional infirmity of sentencing Mr. Williams to life without parole 
                                                 
13 In State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 688–98, 358 P.3d 359 (2015), this Court 
further extended Miller when it allowed the youth of an adult offender to be 
considered as a justification for departures below the standard sentencing range, in 
recognition that the juvenile brain is not fully developed by the age of eighteen. See 
also Bassett, 198 Wn. App. ¶ 46 (discussing O’Dell). While Mr. Williams’ second 
strike was not committed when he was a juvenile, Mr. Williams was still youthful—
23 years old—at the time of his 2004 strike offense. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d at 695 
(noting studies suggesting that the diminished culpability of youth is applicable until 
age 25, when the juvenile brain matures); Reply Br. of Pet’r, App’x B.   
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based in part on a crime committed as a juvenile, the infirmity is even 
more pronounced under the more protective article I, section 14. Article I, 
section 14 jurisprudence explicitly forbids the risk of imposing life 
without parole on those whose crimes reflect transient immaturity, and it is 
under article I, section 14 that the resolution is found. A corollary to the 
categorical bar on juvenile life without parole announced in Bassett is that 
no strike offense committed as a juvenile may count as a strike under the 
POAA.14  
A. Article I, Section 14 Is More Protective than the Eighth 
Amendment. 
 
Our state constitution robustly protects against cruel punishment, 
State v. Witherspoon, 180 Wn.2d 875, 887, 329 P.3d 888 (2014), and 
implicit in that protection is the continuing duty of Washington courts to 
develop article I, section 14 jurisprudence to ensure that it remains more 
protective than the Eighth Amendment. And since our supreme court in 
Fain declared article I, section 14 to be more protective, 94 Wn.2d at 392–
93, Washington courts have continued to so hold in a variety of sentencing 
                                                 
14 This Court could determine that the practice of allowing one or more strike offense 
committed as a juvenile to support a life without parole sentence under the POAA 
violates the Eighth Amendment. However, amicus urges this Court to do so 
specifically under Bassett and article I, section 14. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 
1041-42, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983). 
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contexts.15 So while there is disagreement among federal courts as to 
whether strike offenses committed as juveniles may count as strikes, supra 
at 10-11, there is ample room to reach a different, more protective rule 
under article I, section 14. Cf. Bassett, 198 Wn. App. at ¶ 18.  
B. Fain Proportionality Review Does Not Take into Account the 
Youth of the Offender, in Violation of Miller, Graham, and 
Article I, Section 14.  
 
Proportionality analysis under Fain,16 94 Wn.2d 387, considers the 
crime and the sentence, but does not technically take into account the 
                                                 
15 For persistent offender cases, see State v. Witherspoon, 180 Wn.2d 875, 887, 329 
P.3d 888 (2014); State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652, 674, 921 P.2d 473 (1996); 
State v. Rivers, 129 Wn.2d 697, 712, 921 P.2d 495 (1996); State v. Thorne, 129 
Wn.2d 736, 772, 921 P.2d 514 (1996). For death penalty cases, see State v. Roberts, 
142 Wn.2d 471, 506, 14 P.3d 713 (2000); State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wn.2d 631, 
639, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984). For consecutive sentences, see Wahleithner v. Thompson, 
134 Wn. App. 931, 936, 143 P.3d 321 (Div. I 2006). For cases indirectly supporting 
the conclusion that article I, section 14 provides greater protection than the Eighth 
Amendment, see In re Rupe, 115 Wn.2d 379, 396 n.5, 798 P.2d 780 (1990) (in the 
death penalty context, noting article I, section 14’s greater protection); In re 
Johnston, 99 Wn.2d 466, 478, 663 P.2d 457 (1983) (in a medical license denial case, 
citing Fain as an example of article I, section 14 providing broader protection than 
the Eighth Amendment); State v. Grenning, 142 Wn. App. 518, 545–46, 174 P.3d 
706 (Div. II 2008) (performing a Fain analysis in the consecutive and concurrent 
sentencing context to determine whether the sentence violated article I, section 14 
and the Eighth Amendment); In re Haynes, 100 Wn. App. 366, 375–76, 996 P.2d 637 
(Div. I 2000) (in the exceptional sentencing context, indirectly affirming the 
proposition by performing a Fain analysis to determine whether the sentence violated 
both article I, section 14 and the Eighth Amendment).  
16 Fain proportionality analysis considers whether a particular punishment is 
disproportionate to the crime. 94 Wn.2d at 397–401. That four-factor test examines 
1) the nature of the offense, 2) the legislative purpose behind the statute, 3) the 
punishment the defendant would have received in other jurisdictions for the same 
offense, and 4) the punishment meted out for other offenses in the same jurisdiction. 
Id.; cf. State v. Rivers, 129 Wn.2d 697, 713, 921 P.2d 495 (1996) (replacing the 
second factor with “the legislative purpose behind the statute” when the test is used 
outside the habitual offender context). 
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personal characteristics of the offender, as required by Miller. 567 U.S. at 
470–79. As this Court noted in Bassett, the first Fain factor focuses on the 
characteristics of the crime, and not, as Miller requires, on the mitigating 
qualities that flow from the offender’s youth. Bassett, 198 Wn. App. at 
738 (citing Fain, 94 Wn.2d at 397-98). This Court similarly noted that the 
fourth Fain factor, which considers the punishment meted out in other 
jurisdictions, conflicts with Miller because it “allows comparison with the 
punishment for adult offenders who commit the same crimes.” Id. 
(emphasis in original).  Because Fain proportionality analysis does not 
allow for consideration of the mitigating qualities of youth, applying this 
analysis to life without parole sentences based in part on juvenile strike 
offenses would violate Miller and the Eighth Amendment, in addition to 
article I, section 14.  
C. This Court’s Independent Judgment Analysis from Bassett 
Yields a Corollary of the Categorical Bar Against Juvenile  
Life Without Parole.  
 
This Court has taken the important step of recognizing that article 
I, section 14 is more protective in the juvenile sentencing context by 
categorically barring juvenile life without parole, fully embracing the 
precept that “children are constitutionally different” and acting to address 
the significant risks of applying adult sentencing procedures to juveniles. 
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Because this Court’s categorical bar analysis17 in Bassett largely informs 
the analysis here, amicus discusses the emerging national consensus 
against use of juvenile strikes to support sentencing enhancements and 
argues that this Court’s independent judgment is every bit as salient to this 
particular sentencing context as it was to the Miller-fix statute at issue in 
Bassett.  
i. National consensus 
 
Professor Beth Caldwell’s recent analysis of whether states with 
harsh recidivist statutes18 permit the use of juvenile adjudications as prior 
convictions to enhance sentences under recidivist statutory schemes 
determined that such a national consensus exists. Caldwell, supra, at 617-
25. As of 2012, ten states explicitly exclude use of juvenile adjudications 
as prior convictions for three strikes sentencing. Id. at 619 n.240 (citing 
jurisdictions). Ten additional jurisdictions’ statutes “most likely prohibit 
the use of juvenile adjudications as strikes.” Id. at 619 n.241. Thirteen 
                                                 
17 Washington’s categorical bar analysis determines whether a particular punishment 
against a certain class of people is constitutionally barred given the nature of the 
offense or the characteristics of that class of offenders. State v. Schmeling, 191 Wn. 
App. 795, 799, 365 P.3d 202 (2015). This two-step analysis considers 1) whether 
there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue, and 2) the 
independent judgement of the court, based on its precedent, as to whether the 
punishment is unconstitutional. See id. at 799–800. 
18 Defined as allowing sentences anywhere from 15 years to life. Caldwell, supra at 
618. Other jurisdictions have less severe statutory schemes that permit judicial 
discretion or impose far less severe sentences. Id. 
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additional states appear to prohibit the use of juvenile adjudications as 
strikes through case law. Id. at 620 n.244. In total, as of 2012, thirty-three 
states most likely prohibit the use of juvenile adjudications to count as 
“strikes.” 
While states’ approaches to use of adult convictions of juvenile 
offenders count as strikes vary more than the use of juvenile adjudications, 
Caldwell notes that there may be an “emerging national consensus against 
using adult convictions of juvenile offenders for sentencing 
enhancements.” Id. at 628; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 566 (it is the 
“consistency of the direction of change” rather than a static examination of 
the law at any particular point that is relevant (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304, 315, 122 S. Ct. 2442, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002)). In 2012, 
Caldwell identified at least eight jurisdictions that “prohibit or limit the 
circumstances under which convictions of juvenile offenders in adult court 
may be used for future sentencing enhancement under three strikes laws.” 
Id. at 628 n.282.19 Since then, at least one state, Wyoming, as part of its 
                                                 
19 These eight jurisdictions break down into two categories. Kentucky, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, and Oregon expressly limit or exclude the use of 
juvenile convictions as strikes. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.080(2)(b), 3(b) (West 
2012); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-7 (West 2005); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-23(C) 
(2010); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-09 (1997 & Supp. 2011); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
161.725 (2011). Alabama, New York, and Wisconsin do not allow the use of 
youthful offender convictions of juveniles in adult court as strikes. Ex parte Thomas, 
435 So. 2d 1324, 1326 (Ala. 1982); N.Y. Penal Law § 60.10 (McKinney 2009); State 
v. Geary, 95 Wis. 2d 736, 289 N.W.2d 375, 1980 WL 99313 (Ct. App. 1980). 
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Miller fix statute, not only eliminated juvenile life without parole, but also 
excluded convictions of juveniles in adult court from counting as strike 
offenses under its habitual offender statute. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-
201(b)(ii) (2013) (permitting life without parole for three strikes only after 
three or more previous convictions for “offenses committed after the 
person reached the age of eighteen (18) years of age.”); see also 2013 
Wyo. Sess. Laws 75 (showing Miller fix along with revision to habitual 
offender statute).20 
The determination of a national consensus is not determinative of 
whether a practice violates article I, section 14. Bassett, 198 Wn. App. ¶ 
52. Rather, the Court also employs its independent judgment.  
ii. Independent judgment 
 
In “exercising independent judgment, we consider ‘the culpability 
of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along 
with the severity of the punishment in question.’” Id. ¶ 32 (quoting State v. 
Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 386 (Iowa 2014) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 
67). In Bassett, this Court’s independent judgment of whether article I, 
section 14 permitted juvenile life without parole focused on the 
“unacceptable risk that juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect transient 
                                                 
20 http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2013/Session Laws.pdf. 
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immaturity will be sentenced to life without parole or early release 
because the sentencing court mistakenly identifies the juvenile as one of 
the uncommon, irretrievably corrupt juveniles.” Id. ¶ 59. While the POAA 
does not give sentencing courts any discretion to consider whether a 
juvenile strike reflects the “uncommon, irretrievably corrupt juvenile[]”, 
id., the exercise of that discretion in the POAA context would lead to the 
same risk already identified as unacceptable. Therefore, the only way to 
ensure that Mr. Williams, and others like him who committed strike 
offenses as juveniles, do not end up serving life without parole based in 
part on “crimes [that] reflect transient immaturity,” id., is to adopt the 
corollary proposed by amicus: that no juvenile strike offense may count as 
a strike under the POAA.21 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Amicus respectfully argues that Graham and Miller, together with 
our more protective article I, section 14, counsel that any time juvenile 
conduct triggers adult sentencing schemes, judicial scrutiny is required to 
ensure that the harshest of punishments are not imposed on those who are 
inherently less culpable. Amicus suggests that this Court’s decision in 
Bassett obviates the need for a formal categorical bar analysis in Mr. 
                                                 
21 This would also be a logical extension of Washington law that does not allow 
juvenile adjudications to count as strikes. RCW 9.94A.030(35), (38); see also State v. 
Knippling, 166 Wn.2d 93, 98-102, 206 P.3d 332 (2009). 
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Williams’ case. Instead, if the principles of the diminished culpability of 
youth are to have continuing vitality, those same principles that drove 
adoption of the categorical bar against life without parole in Bassett lead 
to a corollary of the categorical rule here—that under article I, section 14, 
no offense committed as a juvenile can count as a strike.  
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